The "ripe" moment: Zartman's ripeness theory

[MichaSta]

Shalom everybody,
While we in the Middle East are constantly arguing about "the right moment" for negotiations, or the "window of opportunity" for peace, it seems difficult to identify such a moment. Zartman discusses the "ripe" moment.
Zartman’s “ripeness” theory argues that the key to successful conflict resolution lies in the timing of the onset of conflict resolution efforts. The underlying idea is that parties will only engage into conflict resolution efforts when any other alternative, usually unilateral, can no longer result in a satisfactory outcome. The center of the ripeness theory is the “mutual hurting stalemate” (MHS), or rather the parties’ perception thereof. The idea is, as parties find themselves in a situation in which escalation cannot result in victory and the current impasse is hurtful for both parties (not necessarily to the same degree and reasons) they look for a way out. The basic reasoning of this theory and particularly MHS lies in the cost-benefit analysis. As parties find themselves in a pain-producing path, they look for another more advantageous one. MHS is a subjective element and hence does not necessarily need to be based on facts. The second element necessary for starting promising conflict resolution is the parties’ perception that a negotiated solution is possible and the perception that the other party to the conflict (or parties) is willing to search for such a solution as well, i.e. “mutual enticing opportunity” (MEO).
The biggest problem of the ripeness theory is that reaching a MHS and a MEO often includes raising the tension, which often includes intensifying the fighting (i.e. raising the costs). In addition, and Zartman acknowledges this fact, ripeness theory is not a predictive tool to pinpoint “ripe” moments for the initiation of conflict resolution. Rather it is a tool that tries to explain the lack of success of conflict resolution efforts on the bases of the incorrect moment of initialization.

Do you think that this theory can be applied to reconciliation? Is there a “ripe” moment for reconciliation? Must there be a mutually hurting stalemate in terms of reconciliation in order for all parties to successfully engage into such efforts? Is this sufficient? Or must there be a mutually enticing opportunity as well? What could such an opportunity be for reconciliation? How did Rwanda begin reconciliation? Did you "jump" right in or was there a careful deliberation about the timing?

Having been raised as a Jew in Germany I experienced the complicated task that is expressed with the simple word reconciliation. Too much, too fast can be overwhelming, especially for survivors, and too little, too late often has the opposite effect it intended.

I wish you a great remaining weekend.

Best regards from the spring-kissed Tel Aviv

Micha

[EvanKaufman]

Zartman's theory on ripeness is a useful tool for practitioners. It expresses the idea that at some point leaders will see their current violent tactics as no longer capable of producing the goals they had in mind and that the cost is beginning to outweigh the benefits. The problem is that it will most likely take a long time and a lot of atrocities before two sides are able to come to this same realization.
It is a good thing that this realization need to be only a perception and not an objective event. This allows for a skilled practitioner to convince the sides of a mutual hurting stalemate, although this tasks seems difficult. One must be versed in persuasion and be able to challenge pre-established concepts about the conflict that a leader may hold. As Zartman states, one may also try to impose a stalemate as was the case when the U.S. bombed Serbs in the 90's in order to stop their offensive and allow for a greater balance of power between the sides.
In my opinion, this theory implies that there must be some kind of balance of power between the two sides. If one side is much stronger then the other, it would seem difficult to get the stronger side to negotiate because they might be inclined to achieve all their goal and objectives by unilateral force rather then having to compromise through negotiation. This seems to be similar to the case of Israel and Palestine where Israel is the much stronger side and may be weary of making any substantial compromises when they already hold the bigger stick.
In my opinion, there seem to be a tactic that may help the possibility of a ripe moment when their is a preponderance of power on one side. This tactic is international pressure or international awareness.
In order to prove the merits of the first example, international pressure, I will look at the case of Chiapas, Mexico. Chiapas is an indigenous and poor state located in the far South of Mexico. Many people in Chiapas feel that the Mexican Government's control over their land is unjust and thus request more autonomy over their native lands and benefits from its resources. In order to attain their goals, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) was spawned as a 'peaceful' revolutionary group that was willing to stand up to the Mexican government. The power and size of the EZLN was obviously much smaller and weaker then the Mexican government's controlled military, but through innovative tactics, they were able to produce ripe moments for negotiations with the government. This was done through garnering international support through the internet and alligning with NGO's accross the globe. The EZLN was successfully able to bring enough awareness and international support to their issue, that it became extremely difficult for the Mexican government to put down or squash the revolutionary group through violent measures. In a way, this garnering of international support by the EZLN helped balance the power and create a MHS. The EZLN knew that they could not possibly defeat the Mexican military and although the military could defeat the EZLN, it would not be in their best interest with all of the international eyes and support on the side of the EZLN. Zartman talks about an impending or past catastrophe that accompanies the perception of a MHS. In this case, for one side the catastrophe would have been the loss of life, while for the other side, the catastrophe would have been the loss of legitimacy.
This is an important realization, that the power of international support and awareness can be a precursor for a MHS, and hopefully lead to peaceful negotiations. A similar parallel to the Chiapas case is that of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although not completely congruent examples, some similarities with regard to international awareness and support are present. In the past, we have seen the international support of the U.S. on the side of the Israeli's, with the aid of weapons and capital, in order to balance the sides and create ripe moments for negotiations. Although a MHS may lead to negotiations, it does not necessarily mean that the negotiations will lead to a successful compromise, which is a key point noted by Zartman. A MHS is only sufficient for the beginning of negotiations but not for the conclusion. In more recent times, we can see international pressure and support leaning towards the Palestinians which has helped create a balance of power against the Israeli's and will hopefully lead to more negotiations (hopefully fruitful ones this time). I am curious as to whether the Israeli's would be ripe for negotiations with the Palestinians had there not have been as much international awareness and support around the conflict.